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Articles
"OTHER AcTs" EviDENcE: REcENT DEcisioNs BY THE CouRT oF APPEALS
UNDERMINE THE EFFICACY OF MARYLAND RULE

5-404(b)

by Lynn McLain*
I. INTRODUCTION

and justice.

Next to the hearsay doctrine, the darling of evidence
afficionados is "character evidence." Its intricate turnings
intrigue, 1 much as those in a maze. It is easy to make a
wrong turn and find one's passage blocked by an
impenetrable hedge; the challenge then is to backtrack
and refine one's analysis so as to reach the through path.
Unfortunately, in a few recent decisions, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has taken a couple of wrong turns
and trapped our trial judges in the maze. This article is
written to challenge the court of appeals to turn around
and lead the way out.
This article will discuss the rationale for the rules of
evidence, both in general and with regard to those common
law character evidence rules codified in Maryland Rule
5-404(b): the "propensity rule" and the admissibility of
evidence of"othercrimes, wrongs, or acts." The article
will provide an overview of the pre-1998 Maryland case
law on "other acts" evidence. It then will critique the court
of appeals' decisions in Wynn v. State in 1998, Streater
v. State and Klauenberg v. State in 1999, and Sessoms
v. State in 2000. These four cases have unnecessarily
complicated what was already a challenging area of the
law. The added complexities are out of step both with
prior case law and with the text ofTitle 5 ofthe Maryland
Rules, and bring no concomitant benefit to the
ascertainment of the truth or the achievement of fairness

II. PURPOSES OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
IN GENERAL, THE "PROPENSITY RULE," AND
MARYLAND RULE 5-404(b)

• J.D., Duke University School ofLaw, 1974; Member,
Maryland Bar; Professor of Law and Dean Joseph Curtis
Faculty Fellow, University of Baltimore School of Law.
1
See, e.g., PAUL W. GRIMM & MATIHEW G. HJORSTBERG,
FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 4.3
( 1997); LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EviDENCE: STATE AND
FEDERAL§§ 404.1-405.5 (2d. ed. 2001) (and sources cited
therein); JosEPH F. MuRPHY, JR., MARYLAND EviDENCE
HANDBOOK§§ 509-510(E)(6) (3d ed. 1999).

Our trial system is intended to provide a forum where

we can peacefully resolve disputes and redress wrongs.
In recognition ofthe fact that the unrestricted admission of
evidence would so overwhelm the courts as to make them
ineffective, the rules of evidence are intended to help
achieve maximum fairness with a minimum expenditure of
time and judicial resources. Rule 5-102 articulates the
purposes ofMaryland's evidentiary rules as follows: "The
rules in this Title shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promote the growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.''2
One way in which the rules attempt to further these
goals is by minimizing appeals on evidentiary issues. Rule
5-103 requires generally that a timely objection to evidence
must be made at trial in the hope that the question can be
properly resolved there. Absent such an objection, a party
may not complain on appeal that the admission of the
evidence was erroneous.
The most basic and most time-saving rule ofevidence,
which is codified in Ru1e 5-402, excludes evidence that is
irrelevant to the matter at hand. The other, more specific
rules restrict the admission of relevant evidence. For
example, Rule 5-407limits the admissibility of evidence
of subsequent remedial measures, and Rule 5-404
circumscribes the admissibility of character evidence.
The considerations that led to the development of

2

MD. RuLE 5-102. In the text of this Article, a Maryland Rule
will be referred to as "Rule," and a Federal Rule ofEvidence will
be referred to as "FRE."

31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 5
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these and other specific rules are summarized explicitly in
Rule 5-403, the "clean-up batter" ofTitle 5. Even if no
other rule excludes particular evidence, the trial judge
nonetheless has the discretion to exclude it under Rule 5403, which provides: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger ofunfair prejudice, confusion
ofthe issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."3
These general considerations enumerated in Rule 5403 are also reflected in the specific common law rules
codified in Rule 5-404(b). The first sentence ofRule 5404(b) sets forth the general "propensity rule" ofexclusion
of evidence of other acts when offered merely to show
that the actor has acted similarly, or "in character," this
time. The second sentence sets forth the permissibility of
admission of such evidence for other, more specific
purposes. Rule 5-404(b) provides: "Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character ofa person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. "4
The general ''propensity rule" ofexclusion ofevidence
to prove that a person has a "good" or "bad" character
and therefore is somewhat more likely to have acted in a
"good" or "bad" way is not premised on a total lack of
relevance. 5 If the evidence were irrelevant, Rule 5-402
would exclude it; the first clause ofRule 5-404(a)( 1)6 and
the frrst sentence ofRule 5-404(b) would be unnecessary.

3

Mo. RuLE 5-403.

4

Mo. RULE 5-404(b).

5

E.g., Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490,495-96,597 A.2d 956,959-60

As the United States Supreme Court has stated:
The inquiry is not rejected because character is
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them
as to prejudge one with a bad general record
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against
a particular charge. The overriding policy of
excluding such evidence, despite its admitted
probative value, is the practical experience that
its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of
issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. 7
Rule 5-404(b) recognizes that "other acts" evidence
has relevance, but that the strength of its probative value
will vary. The lower the probative value, the higher the
risk of unfair prejudice. For example, the fact that an
accused once stole $20 from his sick grandmother's
pocketbook to buy beer is not strongly probative that he
is thus more likely to have assaulted and raped a stranger
six years later. Any slight probative value the earlier theft
may have concerning his disregard for the law is substantially
outweighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice the jury
against him, for reasons of "bad character" entirely
unrelated to the issues at hand.
The second sentence of Rule 5-404(b) codifies the
common law rule that evolved in recognition that the higher
the probative value ofthe evidence -- that is, the stronger
and more logically persuasive the evidence is ofthe point
it is offered to help prove --the lesser the risk of unfair
prejudice. 8 When the issue is sharpened, and the "other
acts" evidence is probative not just of general character
but is relevant to the narrower issue, "such as," 9 but not
limited to, those listed in the second sentence ofRule 5404(b), the probative value is likely to be higher. When
there is no other available, equally probative evidence on

7

(1991).

Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948)
(footnotes omitted).

6

8

Rule 5-404(a)( 1) provides: "(1) In General. Evidence of a
person's character or a trait or character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion .... "

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 6

See, e.g., Duckworth v. State, 323 Md. 532, 594 A.2d 109
(1991).

9

Mo. RULE 5-404(b).
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an important issue in dispute, the "other acts" evidence
may be helpful, rather than confusing or distracting, to the
fact-finder. 10 Nor will its admission under those
circumstances unduly waste time.

III. TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF RULE 5404(b)AND THE COMMON LAW RULES THAT
IT CODIFIED
Rule 5-404(b) 's use of the phrase "such as" imports
that the permissible purposes listed in the rule are merely
examples of''well-established categories" 11 ofadmissibility
and are not exclusive. Any relevant purpose other than
proving only "character ofa person in order to show action
in conformity therewith" 12 is proper. The court of appeals
has repeatedly referred to this principle as one that the
proffered evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts must
have "special relevance." 13
Under the court of appeals' 1989 decision in State
v. Faulkner, 14 if "other acts" evidence has "special
relevance," it may be admitted by the trial court and heard
by the jury, if the judge is satisfied that there is "clear and
convincing evidence" ofthe other acts and who performed

10

E.g., Streaterv. State, 352 Md. 800,807, 724A.2d 111 (1999).

11

Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 711-12, 415 A.2d 830, 839
(1980) ("Some of the well-established categories of evidence
outside the ambit of the narrow rule of exclusion include
evidence of other crimes which tends to establish ( 1) motive,
(2) intent, (3) absence of mistake, (4) a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to
each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, and
( 5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of a
crime on trial. Other exceptions have been recognized as
well."), cert. denied,466 U.S. 993 (1984).
12

them, and ifthe judge finds that the evidence has sufficient
probative value that it should not be excluded by virtue of
the considerations now codified in Rule 5-403.
The case law interpreting Rule 5-404(b) and the
common law rules that it codified traditionally has looked
not only at the elements of the claim or charge being tried,
but also at the defense presented, to determine on which
issue or issues it may be fair and appropriate to provide
the fact-finder with the "other acts" evidence.
For example, assume that a defendant is charged
with having fractured a child's skull. To make a prima
facie case, the State offers evidence that the child was in
the care ofthe defendant at the time the injury was suffered,
as well as medical evidence regarding the injury and the
type of force that could cause it. Under Rule 5-404(b)
and the case law it codified, if the defendant or another
defense witness testifies that the child's injuries resulted
from the child's accidentally slipping in the bathtub and
hitting his head, the trial judge will have the power to admit,
to prove "absence of ... accident," 15 evidence that the
defendant previously had custody of five other young
children who received head fractures while in her care.
The evidence ofthese other acts would have the requisite
"special relevance" and would be helpful to the jury in
determining whether the injury occurred as the defense
portrays it. The Faulkner gloss on Rule 5-404(b) also
requires, for admissibility, both that there be clear and
convincing proo:f1 6 that the defendant caused the other
fractures and, second, that the judge does not find that the
evidence should be excluded for the reasons codified in
Rule 5-403. 17
This three-step Faulkner process is itself, then, rather
complicated. But, over the past two years, a majority of
the court of appeals has rendered four decisions that

15

Mo.RULE 5-404(b); see, e.g., Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307,311,
718 A.2d 588, 590 (1998) ("In Maryland, it is a rule of exclusion
that recognizes the general exclusion of other crimes evidence
with a group of stated, but not exhaustive, exceptions."); State
v. Faulkner, 314Md. 630,633-35, 552A.2d 896,897-98 (1989).

E.g., Skrivanek v. State, 356 Md. 270,291-92,739 A.2d 12,24
(1999).

13

E.g., Streater, 352 Md. at 808-09, 724A.2dat 114-15.

17

14

314Md. at633-35, 552 A.2dat897-98.

See Duckworth v. State, 323 Md. 532,544-45, 594A.2d 109,
114-15(1991).

16

E.g., Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724,736-39,679 A.2d 1106,
1112-14 (1996); Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602,634-36, 645A.2d
22,37-38 (1994).
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combine to further burden the trial judges and impede the
efficient administration ofjustice.
IV. WYNN AND STREATER FURTHER
COMPLICATE THE TRIAL JUDGES'TASK

In 1998 and 1999 the court of appeals announced
two decisions that have unduly complicated the trial judges'
job with regard to the application of Rule 5-404(b): JiJYnn
v. State 18 and Streater v. State. 19
In JiJYnn, the majority reversed the trial court when
it disagreed with the ground stated by the trial judge for
admission of Rule 5-404(b) evidence. The majority
refused to look at whether the admission of the evidence
was proper under another label. Yet, ifthe admission was
proper, no harm resulted. The court of appeals' approach
in JiJYnn strays from the basic, "no harm, no foul" premise
of appellate review. JiJYnn burdens the system with
unnecessary, costly, time-consuming new trials.
In Streater, the majority reversed the trial judge, even
though it found that she had ruled correctly on the objection
that had been made. Deviating from two well-established
principles, first, that a trial judge need only rule on the
objections raised by counsel at trial, and, second, that only
those will be reviewed on appeal, the majority faulted the
trial court for not proceeding to perform the three-step
Faulkner-5-404(b) analysis sua sponte.
The Streater majority also urged trial judges to
conduct the Faulkner-5-404(b) analysis on the record.
If this directive means that the appellate court will fmd the
lack of such a record to be reversible error, even if the
appellate court, in its own analysis ofRule 5-404(b), would
have reached the same result as did the trial court,
reversible error again will be unnecessarily created.

evidence had special relevance to the accused's "absence
ofmistake," which is a permissible purpose for "other acts"
evidence specifically stated in Rule 5-404(b). The
defendant was tried on ten counts of burglary,
housebreaking, and theft, but the trials were severed into
three.
The third trial was for the fifth and sixth counts, the
housebreaking and theft charges related to one dwelling
(the Quigley home). In the State's case-in-chief at that
trial, evidence was admitted as to the ninth and tenth counts,
housebreaking of and theft from another residence (the
Garrison home) in the same neighborhood on the same
weekend. The State was making an anticipatory strike,
with the expectation that the defendant would rely on the
same defense he had employed in the preceding trials on
the other counts. That defense was that he had bought
from a flea market the items that were later found in his
possession and matched the description of the stolen
goods. 20
The defendant never took the stand at the third trial.
But he offered a defense that, if believed, supported this
alternative explanation for his possession of the Quigley
goods. A defense witness testified that she saw the
defendant at a flea market, carrying several bags of
merchandise. Defense counsel in closing argued that the
defendant had innocently purchased, at the flea market,
the items that were found at his house.2 1
The court of special appeals affmned the defendant's
conviction, on the ground that, "[b]ecause appellant argued
a defense of mistake or accident evidence of prior similar
acts was admissible to show lack ofmistake or accident. "22
The court of appeals reversed.
The majority, in an opinion authored by Judge Cathell,
stressed that the defendant had not yet presented a defense
at the time the other crimes evidence was admitted,23 but

A. Wynn

In Wynn, a majority of the court of appeals found
that the trial court erroneously had concluded that proffered

2o Wynn,

21

351 Md. at 319 & n. 7, 718 A.2d at 594 & n. 7.

/d. at 315, 718 A.2d at 592.

18

351 Md.307, 718A.2d588(1998).

22
Wynn v. State, 117 Md. App. 133, 150, 699 A.2d 512, 520
(1997),rev'd,351 Md.307, 718A.2d588(1998).

19

352 Md. 800,724 A.2d Ill (1999).

23

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 8

351 Md.at314&nn.2-3,333, 718A.2dat591-92&nn.2-3.
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it did not rest its finding of error on that basis. 24 It thus
suggested that this was a risky undertaking on the part of
the State, which was gambling that the accused would
offer a defense of mistake or accident. The crux of the
majority opinion is that the accused did not assert a defense
that the majority felt fit into the Rule 5-404(b) pigeonhole
of "absence of mistake."
This decision is ill-considered for two reasons. First,
the majority read the "absence of mistake" category too
narrowly. Second, even ifthe majority disagreed with the
trial court's reading of "absence of mistake;' the appellate
court should have affirmed the trial court's ruling, ifthe
appellate court found that the evidence would have been
properly admitted under some other rubric. The majority
declined to undertake that inquiry.

1. The Evidence Should Have Been Held to Have
Been Properly Admitted to Prove "Absence of
Mistake"
The rfjlnn majority limited the reach of the "absence
of mistake" category to situations where the accused's
defense was either that he had entered the Quigley house,
but by mistake, or that he had stolen the Quigley property,
but in the mistaken belief that he had a right to it. 25 It
stressed that the defendant was not charged with
possession of stolen property, and reasoned that, therefore,
his "mistake" in possessing those particular goods was
not in issue. 26
But the majority overlooked the Maryland case law
under which it is well established that, absent a reasonable
explanation, the defendant's possession of recently stolen

goods will support a factual inference that he is the thief ''27
Once the defendant puts forward a "reasonable"
explanation of his innocent possession ofthe goods, as a
practical matter he puts the ball back in the State's court
to prove, with additional evidence, that his possession was
not innocent.
The Wynn majority mistakenly opined that, ifthe
challenged "other acts" Garrison evidence were proper in
rfjlnn, similar evidence would be admissible in "virtually
any" theft case when the defendant "pleads not guilty." 28
This is not so. The evidence would not have been
admissible in rfjlnn had the defendant merely put the State's
proof to its test, or had he denied either that he had been
at the Quigley home or that he had the goods in his
possession. It was his argument that he had obtained the
Quigley goods, but innocently, at a flea market, that gave
the Garrison evidence "special relevance."
In her strong dissent, Judge Raker argued that the
trial judge had properly admitted the evidence to prove
absence ofthe accused's mistakenly or accidentally having
the stolen goods. 29 Her analysis focused on the "doctrine
of chances" as proof oflack of accident or coincidence:
[T]he doctrine of chances rests on the trial
court's assessment of the improbability that
someone would be innocently involved in similar
activity.... The unlikely coincidence that Wynn
purchased the items at a flea market triggered
the court's appropriate, albeit unspecified,
application of the doctrine of chances.
Moreover, the clear and immediate limiting

27

24

See id. at 334 n.l, 718 A.2d at 602 n.l ("Notwithstanding the
majority's reference to the fact that the State introduced this
evidence before the defense presented its case, that is clearly
not the ratio decidendi of the majority opinion nor was it the
basis of any objection below.") (Raker, J., dissenting).
25

351 Md.at 332, 718 A.2d at 600. These are, of course, two
situations where the "absence of mistake" category clearly
would apply.
26

Id.at331-32, 718A.2dat600.

E.g., Simms v. State, 83 Md.App. 204,210-12, 574A.2d 12, 1517 (in a trial for daytime house breaking and misdemeanor theft
of a credit card, no error in admitting evidence that defendant
"used the credit card a mere five hours after breaking and
entering was discovered and his flight upon being discovered
[as it was] relevant to proving appellant's guilt without simply
showing propensity."), cert. denied, 321 Md. 68, 580 A.2d 1077
(1990). See Wynn v. State, 351 Md. at 340-43,718 A.2d at 60406 (Raker, J., dissenting).
28

351 Md. at 333, 718 A.2d at 601.

29

Id. at 355,718 A.2d at 612.

31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 9
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instruction given by the trial judge further
supports the conclusion that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of
Wynn's prior criminal acts. 30
Judge Raker had the better reasoned argument.
2. The Majority's Approach Unnecessarily Creates
Reversible Error Even When the Trial Court Has
Ruled Correctly, but has Stated the Wrong Reason
for Its Ruling

Unfortunately, the majority refused to go on to
consider whether the evidence was properly admitted,
under Rule 5-404(b), on any ground other than "absence
of mistake or accident."31 This approach, which the
majority ascribes to "the limitation of our certiorari
jurisdiction" and to allowing the defense an opportunity to
respond to each ground relied on, 32 "misses the forest for
the trees."

30

!d. at 355,718 A.2d at 612. See id. at 334-35,718 A.2d at 60102 ("Wynn's possession of the goods stolen from the Quigley
home, explained throughout his trial defense as the result of an
innocent and unknowing purchase, might otherwise be
characterized as 'unintentional,' 'mistaken' or even
'accidental.' It was for the purpose of dispelling Wynn's
express claim, and its various possible characterizations, that
the trial court rightfully permitted the prosecution to present
evidence of Wynn's possession of goods stolen from the other
residences. His possession was no mistake or accident").
(Raker, J., dissenting).

The logic of the trial court's ruling was clear to the
defense at trial. The defense had ample opportunity to
refute that logic at trial. The court of appeals' requirement
ofwhat it perceives to be the correct "labeling" under Rule
5-404(b) places a formalistic and unduly heavy burden
on the trial judge, and reaps no concomitant benefit in
fairness or justice.
More importantly, under the common sense
approach of"no harm, no foul," 33 the routine handling of
evidentiary rulings is that the trial judge will be affirmed, if
he or she reached an appropriate ruling as to admission or
exclusion, even ifthe judge gave an incorrect reason for
that ruling. 34 To require trial judges not only to reach the
right decisions but also to state the correct reasons for
each of the multitude of evidentiary rulings they make-and to reverse their correct decisions, if they do not-- is
to exalt "form over substance."35
The Tf)lnn court's approach of refusing to perform
the analysis as to whether the trial judge was "right for the
wrong reason" will result in requiring a new trial when no
unfairness resulted from the "incorrect" grounds having
been given at the first trial, for a ruling which, as to the
bottom line, was correct. This would be an extravagant
use ofjudicial resources under any circumstances. But to
impose this unnecessary cost oftime and judicial resources,

rely on a Faulkner first-prong exception never presented below
and then balance its probative [value] with its prejudicial effect,
without affording any opportunity to the defendant to be heard
on that specific exception.") (footnotes omitted).

31

!d. at 318 n.6, 718 A.2d at 593 n.6 (The court's footnote
argues that relevance for another non-character purpose, other
than absence of mistake, is of no consequence: "As we
understand it, if' other crimes' evidence is offered under the
absence of mistake exception and is found to be inadmissible,
the matter is over; a probative value assessment is not made").
32

!d. at 324-25 & n.8, 712 A.2d at 596-97 & n.8 ("[T]he State did
not, in any forum, present the 'doctrine of chances' relied upon
extensively in the dissent. We considered the petition, the
State's limited response, and granted the writ as presented. In
the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction, we do not perceive
any extraordinary facet of this case that leads us to consider an
issue not properly presented. *** It would be, in our view,
equally unfair for this Court to do as the dissent suggests, i.e.,

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 10

33
See Mo. RuLE 5-1 03(a) ("Error may not be predicated upon a
ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless the party is
prejudiced by the ruling .... ").

34
E.g., Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502,403 A.2d 1221, 1223
(1979) ("[W]here the record in a case adequately demonstrates
that the decision of the trial court was correct, although on a
ground not relied upon by the trial court and perhaps not even
raised by the parties, an appellate court will affirm. In other
words, a trial court's decision may be correct although for a
different reason than relied on by that court"), cert. denied, 444
U.S.1021 (1980).
35

Wynn, 351 Md. at 354, 718 A.2d at 611 (Raker, J., dissenting).
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when our courts are already fighting heavy backlogs, is
especially irresponsible.
B. Streater

This undesirable result has been compounded by the
court of appeals' decision in Streater. Streater again
employs too fme-toothed a comb when reviewing a trial
judge's ruling on an objection.
1. Streater Reversed a Trial Court When It Had

Ruled Properly on the Objection Made

In Streater, a majority of the court of appeals, in an
opinion by Judge Chasanow, reversed a trial court's
decision to admit other crimes evidence contained within
a protective order, even though the defense had objected
only to the admission of evidence of the existence of the
protective order, which fact the court of appeals held was
admitted properly. 36 The majority held that the trial judge
was required to have performed the three-step Faulkner
"other acts" analysis on the record, even though no
objection had been made under Rule 5-404(b) and, indeed,
a different objection had been made. This decision places
an unprecedented onus on the trial court.
Streater was tried for stalking his estranged wife. His
lawyer objected to the admission ofevidence that the victim
had obtained a protective order, which required the
defendant to stay away from her. The majority of the
court of appeals held that that fact was properly admitted,
as relevant both to the defendant's course of conduct and
to his having been warned to stay away. 37 This holding
was correct, and the appellate court's role should have
ended there.
But the majority's intimate knowledge of and
exuberance for the intricacies of Rule 5-404(b) took it
too far. It held that the trial court committed reversible
error in admitting the entire protective order without sua
sponte conducting an inquiry as to the admissibility ofother

36

37

352 Md. 800, 724 A.2d Ill (1999).

Jd. at 805, 812-13, 724 A.2d at 113,117.

crimes evidence -- including a break-in of and theft from
the wife's home-- related in the order. 38 This part of the
decision is contnny to two well-established principles under
Maryland case law. First, a party must object to particular
evidence at trial in order to preserve for appeal the question
of its admission. 39 Second, if a party's objection is
specific, the party is restricted to making only that same
argument on appeal. 40 Streater holds trial judges to an
unprecedented standard.
2. Streater Directs Trial Judges to Conduct Their
F aulkner-5-404(b) Analysis on the Record

The Streater majority further burdened trial judges
by directing them to conduct their three-step Faulkner5-404(b) analysis, regarding (1) "special relevance," (2)
clear and convincing proof, and (3) a balancing of
probative value versus unfair prejudice, on the record in
order to enhance appellate review. Repeated comments
to this effect are sprinkled throughout the majority's
opinion. 41 This instruction undermines the approach

38

!d. at 812-23, 724 A.2d at 117-122.

39

MD. RuLEs2-517, 3-517,4-323, and5-103. See, e.g.,
Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 539-45, 735 A.2d 1061, 106670(1999).

40

E.g., Klauenberg, 355 Md. at 541-42,735 A.2d at 1068.

41

See Streater, 352 Md. at 810, 724 A.2d at 116 ("[S]hould the
trial court allow the admission of other crimes evidence, it
should state its reasons for doing so in the record so as to
enable a reviewing court to assess whether Md. Rule 5-404(b),
as interpreted through the case law, has been applied
correctly"); id. at 812, 724 A.2d at 116 ("Nothing in the record
shows that the trial court carefully assessed the admissibility of
the factual findings of other crimes contained within the
protective order"); id. at 819, 724 A.2d at120 ("Because of the
sparse record, we find it difficult to opine on the probative
value and potential prejudice of the 'battery or assault and
battery' finding"); id. at 821 n.IO, 724A.2d at 121 n.lO ("We
agree with the dissent that, in weighing the probative value and
prejudicial effect of other crimes evidence, trial judges "are
not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of
logic' in weighing the competing considerations." In the
instant case, the trial judge did not spell out any reasoning, and

31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 11
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followed by the drafters oiTitle 5, who deliberately declined
to include such a directive in Rule 5-403, for example, for
fear of unnecessarily creating reversible error for failure
simply to state reasoning on the record. 42

Finally, as the dissent points out, a requirement that
the Faulkner-5-404(b) analysis be on the record disserves
the justice system:
The Majority reverses the judgment of the circuit
court because the trial court failed to engage in the
Faulkner analysis on the record. This result is unfair
to trial judges and the public as well.

3. A Strong Dissent
Again, Judge Raker authored a strong, wellreasoned dissent, in which she was joined by Judges
Rodowsky and Cathell. The dissent found first that the
evidence would have been properly admitted, even if a
proper objection had been made. But it also properly
stressed that the majority's opinion, requiring a ruling absent
a proper objection, deviates from pre-Maryland law: "The
effect ofthe majority opinion is that absent any objection
to the factual fmdings contained within the protective order,
or articulated basis for exclusion, the trial court must
nonetheless apply the three-pronged test ofFaulkner, an
approach simply inconsistent with established Maryland
law."43

neither is there any indication that he in fact conducted a
weighing of the probative value and prejudice of the other
crimes evidence.") (emphasis in original; citations omitted); id.
at 822, 724 A.2d at 121-22 ("[l]n the instant case the record
reveals no determinations as to the relevancy, the sufficiency
of evidence that the other crimes occurred, or the probative
value and potential prejudice of admitting the evidence"). See
also Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 566, 735 A.2d 1061, 1081
(1999) ("Because the evidence constituted 'bad acts' evidence
under the circumstances of this case, and was objected to by
Klauenberg, the trial court should have engaged in an on-therecord Faulkner analysis to determine whether the evidence
had special relevance, whether there was clear and convincing
evidence that the acts occurred, and whether the probative
value of the evidence outweighed the unfair prejudice") (Raker,
J., dissenting, joined by Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J.) (citing
Streater).

... While it would certainly be better ifthe trial court
spread the reasons for the ruling on the record, neither
the Maryland Rules nor the case law require the trial
court to do so. The Majority's position is a marked
change in Maryland law. 44

C. Effect of Ujmn and Streater
Tt)lnn and Streater both unnecessarily increase the
burden on the trial judges ruling on the admission of "other
acts" evidence under Rule 5-404(b). Trial judges must
dot their "i 's" and cross their ''t's" perfectly, even ifobjection
on a ground other than Faulkner-5-404(b) is made. Yet
two subsequent decisions ofthe court of appeals itself, in
Klauenberg and Sessoms, exhibit confusion regarding
such evidence. These decisions are likely to compound
the consternation that trial judges might well be enjoying.

V. KLAUENBERG AND SESSOMS MISREAD
RULE 5-404(b)
InKlauenbergv. State, 45 the majority of the court

of appeals with one hand set forth a helpful clarification of
the breadth of Rule 5-404(b)'s phrase "other crimes,
wrongs, or acts," as including both "good" and "bad acts."
But then, with the other hand, it obfuscated matters by
narrowing its discussion ofthe scope ofRule 5-404(b) to
"bad acts." Additionally, although the majority correctly
defined "bad acts" (a definition that could be helpful on an
issue of whether an error was reversible or harmless, as

42

Court of Appeals of Maryland's Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of Oct. 16, 1992
meeting, at 41.
44

!d. at 827-28,724 A.2d at 124-25 (citations omitted).

45

355 Md. 528,735 A.2d 1061 (1999).

43

352 Md. at 823,827, 724A.2dat 122-24 (Raker, J., dissenting,
joined by Rodowsky and Cathell, JJ.).
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opposed to whether Rule 5-404(b) is applicable) it
misapplied that definition.
In Sessoms v. State, 46 the court of appeals
contradicted the text of Rule 5-404(b) and confounded
"other acts" jurisprudence by holding that the Rule does
not apply at all, in criminal cases, with regard to "other
acts" ofanyone except the accused. This decision undoes
the careful structure and public policy resolutions ofRule
5-404(b) and leaves the trial judges equipped only with
Rule 5-403 when ruling, in criminal cases, on the
admissibility of"other acts" evidence of persons other than
the accused. In reaching this decision, the Sessoms
majority relied on Maryland cases that had not raised the
issue before the Sessoms court and misjudged the weight
of the federal case law on the question.
A. Klauenberg

Klauenberg was tried and convicted for soliciting the
murder of court of special appeals Chief Judge Joseph
Murphy, who had presided, in the circuit court, over a
dispute between the defendant and his sister regarding their
father's estate. Evidence was admitted at trial that the
defendant had offered another person money to murder
Chief Judge Murphy.
Evidence of some ofKlauenberg's "other acts" was
admitted: testimony was given regarding the defendant's
threats and menacing behavior to others involved in the
civil lawsuit (his sister, her attorney, and a special auditor),
as well as of his possession of guns and ammunition.
Klauenberg's conviction was not reversed.
1. If the Other Acts Do Not Need to be "Bad" to
Fall Within Rule 5-404(b), Why Does the Court Allow
Itself to Be Taken There?
The majority opinion ofthe court ofappeals, authored
by Judge Cathell, began its Rule 5-404(b) discussion with
promise. It helpfully and correctly explained that Rule 5404(b) concerns "other acts," which may be either "good"
or "bad" and either prior or subsequent to the act at issue

at trial. 47 Nonetheless, for the stated reason that the
defendant's pretrial motion in limine and his trial objections
had been to exclude "bad acts" evidence, the majority
was seduced to define "bad acts" (a category to which, it
had just explained, Rule 5 -404(b) is not restricted).
The majority's definition was as follows: "[A] bad
act is an activity or conduct, not necessarily criminal, that
tends to impugn or reflect adversely upon one's character,
taking into consideration the facts ofthe underlying lawsuit.
It is from this general proposition that we evaluate whether
the evidence to which appellant protests as erroneously
admitted were bad acts under Maryland Rule 5-404(b)."48
The majority then evaluated the matters as to which the
Rule 5-404(b) issue was preserved for appeal49 and, having
found that they did not qualify as "bad acts," concluded
that they thus did not fall within Rule 5-404(b).
The first flaw in the majority's analysis was its focusing
solely on whether the evidence objected to was of"bad
acts" and not, as Rule 5-404(b) states (and as the majority
itselfhad explained), of "other acts." Ifevidence of "other
acts" is erroneously admitted, whether those acts were
"bad" will be relevant only to whether prejudice is likely
to have resulted or if the error is harmless. Klauenberg's
emphasis on whether acts are "bad," and its apparent
holding that Rule 5-404(b) is inapplicable because the acts
were not "bad," is misleading.
Whether admitted evidence is of "other acts"-- not
necessarily "bad acts"-- is the key to whether Rule 5404(b) comes into play. For example, circumstantial
evidence that is relevant to placing a defendant at the scene
of the crime, or as having an instrumentality or fruit ofthe
crime, is admissible to prove the defendant's commission
ofthe charged crime, even though it coincidentally proves

47

355 Md. at 547 n.3, 735 A.2d at 1071 n.3.

48

Jd. at549, 735 A.2dat 1072.

49
46

357 Md. 274,744 A.2d 9 (2000).

A number of objections were waived. Id. at 539-46, 551-55,
735A.2dat 1066-71,1072-75.
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the defendant's commission ofanother crime.50 It is, under
these circwnstances, not considered to be evidence of acts
"other'' than the one charged.

To be sure, the fact that the police stood near
appellant while he was acting peculiarly imparts
a general impression that they feared appellant
might act out. But there is no indication that he
did. Standing in place without moving, which is
the supposed bad act appellant argues should
not have been disclosed to the jury, does not
impugn his character. Standing and watching
while one's house is being searched is probably
a common reaction. Therefore, because this
conduct to which [the lawyer] testified is not a
bad act, the court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting it.

2. Having Been Taken Down a Wrong Turn, The
Majority Struggles to Find the Other Acts Not to Be
"Bad"

Having incorrectly followed the defendant's lead and
set up the inquiry, as to the scope ofRule 5-404(b), to be
whether the defendant's "other acts" were "bad," the
majority then evaluated the objected-to evidence to
determine whether it was evidence of "bad acts." The
majority first reached the noncontroversial conclusion that
the defendant's mere involvement in a civil lawsuit was
not evidence of a "bad act."51 But then it stretched.
It asserted that the sister's lawyer's testimony that
the defendant had become ''verbally confrontational and
poked [the sister's lawyer] in the chest .... is not conduct
that tends to impugn [the defendant's] character."52 It found
that the lawyer's testimony that, during a police search of
the defendant's house,"' [t]here was one place [defendant]
stood without moving while people went into other rooms
in the basement, and fortunately the police were literally
right next to him surrounding him as he went through this
exercise, "'53 and the lawyer "later discovered that there
was a gun stored in the ceiling tiles above the area in which
appellant stood still,"54 was not evidence of"bad acts":

50

See, e.g., Solomon v. State, 101 Md.App. 331,370-74,376-78,
646A.2d 1064, 1083-85, 1086 (1994); Stancil v. State, 78
Md.App. 376,381-84,553 A.2d268, 270-72 (evidence that
defendant, charged with kidnapping a baby, subsequently
applied for food stamps and falsely claimed that she was the
mother of the baby with her, was relevant to show that she
possessed a fruit of the crime and thus to show her identity as
the kidnapper), cert. denied, 315 Md. 692, 556 A.2d 674 (1989).
51

Klauenberg at 550,735 A.2d at 1072-73.

52

!d. at 551,735 A.2d at 1073.

53

/d. at 550, 735 A.2d at 1073.

54

!d.
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Similarly, [the lawyer's] testimony that two guns
and ammunition were found on appellant's
premises, without more, does not constitute a
bad act.. .. There was no indication that these
firearms were obtained or possessed illegally.
No evidence was offered at trial that appellant's
guns were to be used in the murder. Therefore,
under the circumstances of this case, the
evidence of appellant's conduct toward [the
lawyer] and the evidence of the guns were not
bad acts. 55
The majority's reasoning here was unpersuasive.
Certainly, the defendant's acts, in the context ofthe case,
would not be perceived as innocent by most jurors. His
possession ofguns and ammunition, coupled with his anger
and his threatening behavior toward a participant in the
civil suit, would make him seem dangerous.
For this reason, it was not surprising that Judge Raker,
joined by ChiefJudge Bell and Judge Eldridge, again filed
a strong dissent; they would have found reversible error
under Rule 5-404(b) in the admission ofthis evidence, as
well as in the admission of other evidence during the guilt/
innocence phase of the trial, tending to show the
defendant's "bizarre" behavior, when the trial court had
bifurcated for a later trial the issue of lack of criminal

55

Jd. at 550-51, 735 A.2d at 1073.
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responsibility.56
3. A Better Route to Affirmance
In order to affirm Klauenberg 's conviction, the
majority did not need to find that the objected-to evidence
was not within the ambit of Rule 5-404(b ). The
defendant's involvement in the civil lawsuit was not a ''bad
act", but it was an "other act," so the court of appeals
should have applied Rule 5-404(b). The civil lawsuit was
properly admissible under Rule 5-404(b), because it had
"special relevance" to the defendant's motive to have Judge
Murphy murdered. Proving "motive" is one of the
permissible purposes specifically listed in Rule 5-404(b)
for "other acts" evidence. This was, correctly, the basis
of Judge Hubbard's ruling at triat5 7
Moreover, Klauenberg's defense apparently was
lack of intent. 58 The menacing conduct toward the sister's
lawyer was an "other act," so that Rule 5-404(b) applied.
But it was "specially relevant" to prove the defendant's
anger toward his perceived adversaries in the lawsuit and
thus admissible, under Rule 5-404(b), to show his intent
to commit the charged crime. The majority should have
aflmned the trial court's ruling on that basis.
Because Klauenberg 's ability to personally commit
the murder was not at issue, the most problematic piece
of" other acts" evidence, with the greatest potential for
causing unfair prejudice, was the description of the guns
and ammunition at his house. It is unclear whether he may
have planned to provide a weapon to the man he asked to
murder Chief Judge Murphy. But, given the fact that
"[b]oth the State and the defense talked to the jury about
whether Klauenberg had the means to commit the
offense," even the dissent concluded that,"[u]nder these
circumstances, Klauenberg's possession of guns and
ammunition might well have been highly relevant to the

56
!d. at 559-60,563 n.5, 735 A.2d at 1077-78, 1079 n. 5 (Raker, J.,
dissenting, joined by Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J.).

!d. at 563,735 A.2d at 1079 (Raker, J., dissenting, joined by
Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J.).

proceedings." 59 Having the means was not only on its
own a purpose other than merely proving character, it was
also relevant to intent to have the murder committed, and
thus its admission under Rule 5-404(b) was not an abuse
of discretion.
4. Effect
The majority opinion in Klauenberg properly
articulates, but then clouds, the fact that Rule 5-404(b)
addresses "other acts," not only "bad acts." It also
provides a strained interpretation of what types of acts
are not "bad," rather than simply holding that the "other
acts" evidence was properly admitted to prove motive
and intent. For both of these reasons, the opinion may
mislead trial courts in future cases.
B. Sessoms
The court of appeals' decision in Sessoms
misconstrues Rule 5-404(b). Unlike Rule 5-404(a)(l )(A)
and (B), which refer specifically to "the accused" and "the
prosecution,"60 Rule 5-404(b) speaks broadly of "a

59

!d. at 560-61,735 A.2d at 1078.

60

Mo. RuLE 5-404(a)(l) provides:

(1) In General. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait or character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(A) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of an accused offered by the accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same;
(B) CharacterofVictim. Evidence of a pertinent trait
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused or
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;

57

58

!d. at 560 & n.2, 735 A.2d at 1078.

(C) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of
a witness with regard to credibility, as provided in Rules 5-607,
5-608, and 5-609. (Emphasis added.)
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person."61 Yet, in Sessoms, the court of appeals made
the stunning announcement that, in criminal cases, Rule 5404(b) applies only to "other acts" ofthe "accused." The
Sessoms majority removes the Rule's carefully structured
analysis from a criminal case in which evidence of other
acts by anyone else is offered. Taking away the application
ofthe propensity rule removes one ofthe central supports
of our justice system, essential to keeping trials focused
on the case at issue.
In Sessoms, this liberalization ofthe rules ofevidence
was accomplished with regard to a person neither defendant
nor victim, whose other acts were not central to what
happened between the defendant and the victim. The
Sessoms majority found that the exclusion under Rule 5404(b) of evidence of allegations of other crimes by the
alleged rape victim's brother was reversible error.
Sessoms leaves criminal trial courts with only Rule
5-403 to assess the admissibility of evidence of"other
acts" by persons other than the accused. The three
dissenting judges, Judge Wilner, joined by Judges
Rodowsky and Raker, would have aiirrmed the trial court's
ruling as a proper exercise of discretion under Rule 5403.
The court ofappeals could better achieve the purpose
it had in mind by leaving Rule 5-404(b) intact in its
application to acts of all persons and tweaking instead
that part of the Faulkner gloss that requires "clear and
convincing evidence" ofthe other acts.

told her brother, and that her brother and a friend
subsequently severely beat the defendant. 64
Medical testimony and other circumstantial evidence,
some of which was testified to by the victim's brother,
supported the victim's testimony of rape and of its having
occurred in the alley. 65 The brother's character for
truthfulness was impeached by his prior convictions for
robbery, including a robbery the day after the alleged
rape. 66
The defendant testified that he was beaten
unconscious by two men, one of whom claimed that the
defendant had robbed the man's sister. 67 When he regained
consciousness in the hospital, he noticed that money and
lottery tickets were missing from his pockets. 68
The trial court permitted the defense to question the
victim to establish that, when a police officer drove her
home from the hospital where she had been examined and
treated, she initially identified a man on the street as her
brother, but a moment later said, "'I ain't saying it is my
brother or isn't my brother. "'69 The trial court refused to
allow the defense to show that, in the time intervening
between those statements, a third man (notthe defendant)
ran up to the police car and said that he had just been
robbed by the person whom the victim had identified as
her brother. 70
The court of appeals held, first, that Rule 5-404(b)
and the three-step Faulkner analysis under it simply do
"not apply [in criminal cases] to crimes, wrongs, or acts

1. Facts and Holding
Sessoms, a man, was charged with raping a woman.
The defendant was convicted only ofa third-degree sexual
offense. 62 The court of appeals reversed.
The victim testified that the defendant, who was a
stranger to her, dragged her into an alley and raped her
twice at knife point. 63 She testified that she ran away and

64

65

See id. at 277-78, 744 A.2d at 11 (majority opinion); id. at
296-97, 744A.2d at 21 (Wilner, J., dissenting, joined by
Rodowsky and Raker, JJ. ).

66

!d. at 302-03, 744 A.2d 24-25 (Wilner, J., dissenting, joined by
Rodowsky and Raker, JJ.).

67

!d. at 278, 744 A.2d at 12.
!d. at 279, 744 A.2d at 12.

61

Mo. RULE 5-404(b), supra at text accompanying note 4.

68

62

Sessoms v. State, 357 Md.274, 281, 744A.2d 9, 13 (2000).

69

63

!d. at 277, 744 A.2d at 11.

70
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committed by anyone other than the defendant."71 It then
held that the trial court had committed reversible error in
excluding the evidence ofthe allegation ofanother robbery
by the victim's brother, as it was relevant to bias on the
part of both the victim and the brother and should have
been admitted under Rule 5-616(b)(3). The court of
appeals was wrong on both counts.
A better course, which would achieve appropriate
protection ofthe accused, would be to recognize that Rule
5-404(b) applies, but either to hold that the part of the
Faulkner gloss that requires "clear and convincing
evidence" ofthe other acts is applicable only to other acts
of the accused, or to overrule Faulkner as to that higher
standard altogether.

2. The Court of Appeals Incorrectly Held that Rule
5-404(b) is Inapplicable to Acts of Persons Other
Than the Accused
Judge Cathell, writing for the Sessoms majority,
stated:
We hold that the test for admitting other crimes
evidence in criminal proceedings enunciated in
Faulkner generally does not apply to crimes,
wrongs, or acts committed by someone other
than a criminal defendant....Because this rule is
premised upon protecting an accused from
undue prejudice, it does not apply to exclude
other crimes evidence involving alleged actions
by others testifying in the criminal proceedings. 72
Such evidence will be subject to exclusion pursuant only
to Rule 5-403.
The removal of Rule 5-404(b) 's strictures tips the
scales in favor of admission of"other acts" evidence in
criminal cases with regard to acts of persons other than
the accused, in two respects. First, Rule 5-403, unlike
Rule 5-404(b), is a rule favoring admission, unless the

probative value is "substantially outweighed" by one or
more of the countervailing considerations. Second, the
application of only Rule 5-403 removes the requirement
that there be "clear and convincing"73 proof ofthe other
acts.

a. The Majority Misread Rule 5-404(b) and Prior
Maryland Case Law
Traditional rules of statutory construction dictate that
the phrase "a person" in Federal Rule ofEvidence ("FRE")
404(b) and Maryland Rule 5-404(b) be read to mean "a
person"74 --not, as Sessoms in effect has held, "a person
in civil cases, but in criminal cases, only the accused."
The Sessoms majority cited Maryland cases applying
the Rule 5-404(b) "propensity" rule to the accused, and
the rationale therefor, stressing the risk of unfair conviction
of the accused because of the admission of other acts
evidence. 75 It jumped to the conclusion that, therefore, it
had "consistently held that, in a criminal proceeding, [Rule
5-404(b), and its Faulkner analysis] is a standard limited
to acts committed by a defendant." 76 This is an
overstatement of the prior Maryland case law.
None ofthe Maryland cases cited for this proposition
in Sessoms involved facts where "other acts" evidence

73

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

74

See United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2dl229, 1232 (9th Cir.
1991 ). ("Fed.R.Evid. 404(a) provides that evidence of"a
person character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith except for pertinent character
traits of an 'accused,' F ed.R.Evi d. 404(a)(1 ), a 'victim,'
Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(2), or a 'witness,' Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(3), 607,
608, 609. It therefore appears that Congress knew how to
delineate subsets of 'persons' when it wanted to, and that it
intended 'a person' and 'an accused' to have different
meanings when the Rules speak of one rather than the other.
Because Rule 404(b) plainly proscribes other crimes evidence
of 'a person,' it cannot reasonably be construed as extending
only to 'an accused"') (emphasis in original).

s"

11

!d. at281, 744 A.2dat 13.

75

Id. at 283-84, 744 A.2d at 14-15.

72

/d. at294, 744A.2dat20.

76

Id. at 283, 744 A.2d at 14.
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had been offered as to anyone other than the accused. 77
The issue never having arisen, it is misleading to state that
the court of appeals thus had held that the "other acts"
rule is limited to acts committed by only the accused.
In addition, the Sessoms court overlooked the fact
that risk of an unfair conviction is not the lone rationale for
Rule 5-404(b). If it were, Rule 5-404(b) would be
restricted, as is Rule 5-404(a)(l ), to "the accused" only.
Rule 5-404(b) instead refers to "a person" and is applicable
in both civil and criminal cases. Its rationale is comprised
of all the considerations summarized generally in Rule 5403: a balancing of the relevance, i.e., the strength of the
"probative value" of the evidence, against (1) the risk of
"unfair prejudice" to any party (as well as the risk of
unnecessary humiliation and embarrassment ofa non-party
witness, which concern is directly recognized in Rules 5412 and 5-611(a)); (2) the "distraction" ofthe jury from
the most important issues in the case; and (3) the injudicious
use ofprecious court "time." Particularly in criminal cases,
where discovery is narrower than in civil cases, the risk of
surprise is also a factor.
All these concerns apply in a criminal case with regard
to evidence of "other acts" of persons other than the
accused. It is easy to foresee, for example, a defendant's
argument that someone other than she committed the
charged crime. The defendant then might offer "other acts"
evidence of that third person to show that he committed
this one. This possibility raises all the concerns ofpossible
unfair prejudice to the State, confusion, and waste oftime,
which the drafters ofthe rules resolved by the combination

77

The facts concerned other acts of only the accused in the
following cases cited in Sessoms, id. at 283-84, 744 A.2d at 1415; Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307,316-317, 718A.2d588, 592-593
(1998); State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363,368-369,701 A.2d389, 392
(1997); Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 560, 693 A.2d 781, 798
(1997);Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602,630,645 A.2d22, 35 (1994);
State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 633, 552 A.2d 869, 897 (1988);
Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329,333, 465A.2d 1166, 1168 (1983);
State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232,238, 395A.2d 1182, 1185 (1979);
Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468,473, 386A.2d 757,761 (1978);
McKnightv. State, 280 Md. 604,612,375 A.2d 551,556 (1977);
and Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664,669, 350A.2d 680,684 (1976).
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ofRule 5-404(b) (which codifies Faulkner's requirement
of "special relevance") and Rule 5-403 (in its role to
possibly exclude weak evidence that passes muster under
Rule 5-404(b)). 78
b. Federal Authority and Case Law of Other States
is Less Supportive of Sessoms than the Court
Indicates

The Sessoms majority overstates its support when it
cites twelve federal cases and five cases from states outside
Maryland as having adopted the interpretation ofFRE
404(b) and its state corollaries (like Maryland Rule 5404(b)) that the majority espouses: that in a criminal case,
Rule 404(b) applies only to evidence ofthe accused's other
acts. 79 It asserts that "[ o]nly the Ninth Circuit has
expressed the minority view," i.e., that FRE 404(b) applies
not only to acts by the accused but also to "acts committed
by witnesses."80 In a footnote, the Sessoms majority itself
points out, however, that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit "later questioned its own
reasoning" in having held as Sessoms does. 81
Indeed, a number of the non-Maryland cases cited
by the Sessoms majority in support of its decision are not
on point. Three, from the United States Courts ofAppeals
for the First and Eighth Circuits, concern other issues
altogether, such as who has standing to object under FRE
404(b). 82 Several others, decided by the Second, Fifth,
and Eleventh Circuits, did not involve FRE 404(b) "other
acts" at all, but acts by co-conspirators that were part of

78

See infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.

79

/d.at287-91, 744A.2dat 16-19.

80

!d. at 290 n.5, 744 A.2d at 18.

81

!d. at 289 n.5, 744 A.2d at 18.

82

Ofthose cases, United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 736 (1st
Cir. 1991)(cited in Sessoms, 357 Md. at288, 744A.2dat18)
addressed only the issue of standing to object.
David, 940 F.2d at 737, cites United States v. GonzalezSanchez, 825 F.2d 572 (lstCir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987)
(cited in Sessoms, 357 Md. at 289,744 A.2dat 18). In Gonzalez-
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the charged crime or conspiracy at issue at trial. 83
Nor do the cases the Sessoms court cited that did
concern "other acts" by third parties provide the
ovetwhelming support that its opinion suggests. Several
ofthe cited cases from two circuits (the Fifth and Eleventh)
and three states (Colorado, Massachusetts, and New
Jersey) unthinkingly rely on dictum in one Fifth Circuit case,
in which evidence of a third person's acts was admitted in
the government's case against the accused. And other
cases from six federal circuits (the Second, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh) and three states (Michigan,
Nebraska, and Ohio) support the view characterized in
Sessoms as the "minority" view.
(1) Evidence of Others' Acts Admitted Against the
Accused
In three federal cases cited by the Sessoms majority,
the evidence of others' "other acts" was admitted against

Sanchez, FRE 404(b) was inapplicable, because the evidence in
question was not offered to prove anyone's propensity to
commit crime. 825 F.2d at at 582-83. The part ofthe case
quoted by the Sessoms Court is dictum, citing Morano (see
infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text). The GonzalezSanchez court also found as an alternative that, even ifFRE
404(b) applied, the evidence was properly admitted; but, if error,
it was harmless error. /d. at 583.

In United States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619, 622-23 (8th Cir.
1976),cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977)(citedinSessoms, 357
Md. at 290, 744 A.2d at 18), the defendants, who were union
officials charged with acts of violence towards the victims, had
wished to cross-examine the victims about their having
threatened the defendants and having been violent towards
them on other occasions. But, as there was no claim of selfdefense, this evidence was held to be irrelevant as substantive
evidence. FRE 404(b) therefore was inapplicable. The court of
appeals also held that the trial court had not clearly abused its
discretion in finding the evidence irrelevant to the witness's
propensity for truthfulness. 545 F.2d at 623.
83

United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (11th Cir.l989); United
States v. Sepulveda, 710 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Bates, 600 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1979) (cited in
Sessoms, 357 Md. at 289-90, 744 A.2d at 18).

the accused. The first, decided in the Fifth Circuit,
stated in dictum that FRE 404(b) might not apply; the
second and third, decided in the Eleventh Circuit, relied
on that dictum.
In United States v. Krezdorn, 84 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found no error in
the admission, against the accused, of evidence of a third
person's acts, saying that, "[a]rguably,"85 Rule 404(b) did
not apply. The court went on to hold that, even if Rule
404(b) applied, the evidence was properly admitted as
proof of a "common scheme" between that third person
and the accused, regarding the charged crimes themselves.
Therefore, its decision did not rest on the "arguable"
inapplicability of FRE 404(b).
Yet this dictum bred a number of progeny, including
two cases decided per curiam by the United States Court
ofAppeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 1983 (which in 1990
questioned its own reasoning in the case 86). In United
States v. Edwards, 87 the court of appeals correctly held
that the "other acts" evidence, a co-conspirator's
statements regarding the illegal drug business, was properly
admissible as to the "knowledge" of that co-conspirator,
which is a permissible purpose listed explicitly in FRE
404(b). It also went on to state, however, that the evidence
in any event would not be subject to FRE 404(b), and

84
639 F.2d 1327, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1981). Additionally, the court
of appeals did not find reversible error in the admission of other
acts evidence regarding the accused, even though the
appellate court found it not to have special relevance. /d. at
1331-32.

85
/d. at 1332. See id. at 1333 ("We need not decide, however,
whether Rule 404(b) applies to this situation since the evidence
of monetary payments is admissible whether or not Rule 404(b)
applies").

86

United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 604-05 & n.11 (11th Cir.
1990) (also stating that admission of that evidence would have
complied with FRE 404(b), anyway, because it was offered to
show law enforcement defendants' knowledge that a third
person, whom they allowed to beat a prisoner, was violent).
87

696 F.2d 1277, 1279-81 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983).
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cited Krezdorn.
In United States v. Morano, 88 the Eleventh Circuit
court of appeals again stated that FRE 404(b) was
inapplicable with regard to evidence ofprior arsons ofthe
''torch" whom the accused had allegedly hired to commit
the charged arson, offered by the prosecution to show
modus operandi, identity, and common plan with the
accused. The court explicitly relied on "dictum" in
Krezdorn as support for its conclusion. 89 But the court
explained that the same principles that underlie FRE 404(b),
regarding special relevance, should be followed in applying
FRE 403 90 and affirmed the decision not to exclude the
evidence under FRE 403 (the Sessoms dissent would
have followed this approach).
Clearly, none of these cases provides strong support
for Sessoms. Moreover, the stated rationale of Sessoms
-- to protect only "the accused" against unfair prejudice - is not at all advanced by more freely admitting this "other
acts" evidence offered by the prosecution as part of its
case: quite the contrary.

the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. McCourf 1
is the most thoughtful of the cases holding FRE 404(b)
applicable to such "other acts" evidence concerning
persons other than the accused, but it does not stand alone.
Three other federal courts of appeal and appellate courts
in three states concur with McCourt.

(a) Cases Contra to Sessoms
In McCourt, in an opinion authored by Judge Rymer,
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's exclusion,
under FRE 404(b ), of evidence offered by the accused
that a third person had committed other crimes and
therefore had likely committed the charged crimes. The
court of appeals found that the proffered evidence was
merely of propensity (i.e., in Maryland's phrase, it had no
"special relevance") and was properly excluded. The court
reviewed many ofthe decisions cited in Sessoms, as well
as others, and pointed out their shortcomings. Judge
Rymer pointed out:

(2) Evidence of Others' Acts, Offered or Admitted

While [the appellant] correctly notes that several
opinions "state" that Rule 404(b) applies to acts
committed by the defendant, none holds that it
applies only to the defendant.
Most circuits which have commented on the
applicability of Rule 404(b) to prior acts of
persons other than the defendant draw on dicta
from United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d
1327 (5th Cir. 1981). 92

by the Accused

The cases in which, like Sessoms, the accused is the
party offering the "other acts" evidence regarding third
persons, are not nearly as one-sided as the Sessoms
majority asserts. The United States Court ofAppeals for

McCourt cited favorably three decisions ofthe Fifth and
Third Circuits that had affirmed the exclusion, under FRE
404(b), of evidence of"other crimes" by persons other
88

697 F.2d 923,926 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).

89

!d.

90

Id. ("[A]lthough Rule 404(b) does not control this situation,
the exceptions listed in the Rule should be considered in
weighing the balance between the relevancy of this evidence
and its prejudice under Rule 403. In this case, the arson at
[defendant's business] and the arson for which [the torch] was
convicted bear such striking similarities as to 'mark them as the
handiwork of the same individual.' United States v. Goodwin,
492 F.2d 1141, 1154 (5th Cir. 1974); cfFed.R.Evid. 404(b)
(evidence of plan or identity)").
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91
925 F.2d 1229(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 837 (1991).
Accord United States v. Spencer, 1 F.3d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir.
1992) (no abuse of discretion in precluding defendant charged
with being convicted felon in possession of firearm, based on
gun seized from owner's automobile in which defendant was
passenger, from presenting evidence of unrelated arrest and
seizure of another handgun from car owner in another car).

92

925 F.2d at 1233.
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than the accused. 93
In 1983 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the exclusion, under
FRE 404(b), of evidence of a non-accused's other acts,
that would have been favorable to the defense. The
defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit
extortion regarding a rape allegedly committed on one of
them by the government's witness. The government's
witness testified that the sexual act had been consensual.
The trial court refused to permit the defense to prove that
the witness had previously raped other persons, in order
to show that he had raped the defendant. The appellate
court affirmed, stating that "the defendants' purpose in
attempting to introduce such evidence was precisely what
is forbidden under this rule [FRE 404(b)] ."94
The Third Circuit also a:trmned the exclusion ofthird
persons' "other acts" evidence offered by the defense. In
a 1983 drug case, the informant testified for the
government. The defendant, who argued that he had been
entrapped by the informant's convincing him to get drugs,
offered evidence of previous fraudulent schemes by the
informant, to show that the informant had been duplicitous
with others and thus with the accused. 95 The trial court
was held to have correctly excluded the evidence, under
both FRE 404(b) and 608(b), as well as to have excluded
it as cumulative when it was offered for impeachment
purposes.
In a 1982, per curiam decision, the Third Circuit
similarly held that the district court had properly applied
FRE 404(b) to exclude evidence of a government witness s
involvement in a past scheme, when there was no evidence
that the defendant had been the victim ofa similar scheme.%
McCourt also quotes four leading treatises on the
Federal Rules ofEvidence, the authors ofwhich all agree
that FRE 404(b) applies to acts of persons other than the

93

!d. at 1235.

94

United States v. Reed, 715 F.2d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 1983).

95

United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757,762 (3d Cir. 1983).

96

United States v. Sturm, 671 F.2d 749, 751 (3d Cir.1982) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 842 (1982).

accused. 97
Subsequent to McCourt, state appellate courts in
Michigan, 98 Nebraska, 99 and Ohio 100 have followed
McCourt on this issue. In addition, the United States
Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit101 has twice ruled
contrary to Sessoms.

97

925 F.2d at 1232 n.2 (quoting 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140, at 175 (rev. ed. 1985); 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, EVIDENCE 'IJ404(04], at 404-39-40 (1989);
WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE§ 404.4, § 404.12, at 80, 88
(1987); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE§ 5239, at457-58 (1978)).

98

People v. Catanzarite, 536 N.W.2d 570, 572-73 (Mich. App.
1995) (defendant must comply with Rule 404(b) when offering
other crimes evidence regarding third person; under facts, no
abuse of discretion in excluding evidence); People v. Rockwell,
470N.W.2d673, 674-75 (1991) (per curiam) (semble).

99

State v. Gardner, 498 N.W2d 605, 609-10 (Neb. App. 1993)
(propensity evidence offered by defendant to show that third
person had committed charged child molestation was properly
excluded under Rule 404(b)).
State v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 932, 950-51 (Ohio 1998) (some
evidence offered by defense qualified under Rule 404(b ), e.g.,
to explain blood in car, and some did not).
100

101

United States v. Hart, 70 F. 3d 854, 859 (6th Cir. 1995)
(evidence of alleged accomplice's prior deceptions of FBI and
IRS agents in unrelated case was inadmissible in defendant's
prosecution for embezzlement and filing false income tax
returns, when defendant offered it to show that accomplice's
past success in conning federal agents made it more likely that
he would have succeeded in conning defendant in instant
case; "As [the accomplice] was neither the accused, a victim,
nor a witness in this case, none of the Rule 404(b) exceptions
would permit the introduction of the proffered character
evidence"), reh 'gdenied, cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1127 (1996);
United States v. Peters, 15 F. 3d 540,545 (6th Cir. 1994)
(excluding, under FRE 404(b ), allegations that police officer had
previously planted cocaine on suspect in unrelated case for
prosecution for possession and conspiracy to possess crack
cocaine with intent to distribute was not abuse of discretion, in
absence of evidence that officer had opportunity to plant drugs
in instant case), reh 'g denied, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 883 (1994).
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(b) Cases Supportive of Sessoms: Defense of
Mistaken Identity
On the other side of the scales, decisions from
three states, cited by Sessoms, have held that FRE 404(b)
does not apply to evidence of acts ofthird persons. These
cases involved evidence offered by the accused in support
of a defense of mistaken identity.

(i) Cases Supporting Sessoms
Four of these cases -- from Colorado and New
Jersey -- involved defenses of misidentification by
eyewitnesses; evidence of the third person's similar acts
was offered to identifY him, rather than the accused, as
the perpetrator of the charged crime. 102 Another case,
from Massachusetts, involved the defendant's offering
evidence ofhis having been misidentified earlier by another
victim, in another case. 103

102
People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916,918-20 (Colo. 1982) (but no
error in exclusion under facts of case), appeal dismissed, 459
U.S. 803(1982); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981) (evidence should have been admitted); State v.
Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 388 A.2d 587 (1978) (remanding, however,
to determine strength of defendant's proffer; defendant wanted
to show that similar crimes had been committed at times for
which he had alibis, to show that he had been misidentified)
(see also discussion of other jurisdictions' cases, 388 A.2d at
591-92) (note that three dissenting justices would not have
remanded; of these, two would have affirmed, and one
reversed, the conviction); State v. Williams, 214 N.J. Super. 12,
20, 518 A.2d 234, 238 (App. Div. 1986). See also Winfield v.
United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1996) (reversible error to
exclude evidence). See generally Annot., Admissibility of
Evidence ofCommission of Similar Crime by One Other Than
Accused, 22 A.L.R.5th (1994).
103

Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563,467 N.E.2d 155,
158 (1984) (earlier misidentification of defendant as to another
crime, where defendant could not have committed it). The
evidence in Jewett would not seem to fit the "identity" route
for substantive evidence in FRE 404(b), yet the appellate
court puzzlingly stated that the evidence did not come in to
impeach the second victim's identification -- suggesting,
therefore, that the evidence was substantive.

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 22

The courts in these cases seemed to feel constrained
to avoid FRE 404(b) so as to lower the bar for the degree
of distinctiveness that the defendant would have to show
in order to make the "other crimes" evidence sufficiently
similar to the charged crime. They overlooked the fact
that the language of the Rule does not require such
distinctiveness. The degree of distinctiveness is merely a
factor, instead, in the balancing of probative value versus
the risk of unfair prejudice. The Colorado, New Jersey,
and Massachusetts courts could have reached the same
result, as to admissibility, under FRE 404(b), coupled
with FRE 403 (i.e., two parts ofthe Faulkner-5-404(b)
tripartite analysis).

(ii) A 404(b) Approach Was Possible
Thus, the better approach, leading to the same result,
would have been to resolve these cases under FRE
404(b), by finding the evidence admissible to prove
"identity," if the other crimes were sufficiently similar
to the charged crime so as to have enough probative
value to be worthy of admission. 104 Several other cases
not cited in Sessoms -- from the District of Columbia
and from Maryland's Court of Special Appeals -properly have affirmed the exclusion of such evidence
when it lacks sufficiently strong probative value to have
the necessary "special relevance" under 404(b). 105 Both

104

See Gates v. United States, 481 A.2d 120, 124-25 (D.C.
App. 1984) (no abuse of discretion in excluding hearsay
evidence offered by defense regarding a rape, of which rape
defendant was wrongly accused, for purposes of arguing that
defendant had a look-alike who was a rapist, where the proffer
lacked details as to modus operandi, characteristics of the
victim, and time of day), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985).
105

Jamison v. United States, 600 A.2d 65,69-70 (D.C. App.
1991) (evidence that defendant's son, who lived elsewhere but
visited defendant's house regularly, had been seen in
possession of cocaine outside of house, was properly excluded
in narcotics prosecution based on discovery of cocaine in
house, absent evidence of temporal connection); Johnson v.
State, 4 Md. App. 648, 244 A.2d 632 (1968) (proper to have
excluded evidence of witness's prior conviction for possession
of barbiturates, which would have been admissible only with
regard to impeachment of credibility of witness and would have

Articles
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Third Circuits in the Stevens 106 and Aboumoussallem 107
cases, cited favorably in Sessoms, have held that a
defendant is free to offer "reverse 404(b)" evidence
concerning another person, to identify that person as the
perpetrator of the charged crime, as long as its probative
value is not substantially outweighed by FRE 403
considerations.

c. Half and Half: Aboumoussallem and Stevens
Provided Greater Protection for the Accused, But
Utilized Both FRE 404(b) and 403
The Second and the Third Circuits have applied both
FRE 404(b) and 403 to "other acts" evidence offered by
the accused regarding another person.
In
Aboumoussallem, decided in 1984 by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the accused's
defense was that he had been duped into carrying drugs.
He offered evidence that his coconspirators had duped
others, on the theory that it was admissible under FRE
404(b) to show that they had duped him as part of a
"common plan." 108 The court of appeals stated that the

trial court had erred not in applying FRE 404(b) at all,
but in applying the same standard, under FRE 404(b), to
exculpatory evidence of "other crimes" of third parties
relevant to the accused's defense, as it would to evidence
ofthe accused's similar acts, offered by the govemment. 109
The court of appeals reasoned that "when the defendant
offers similar acts evidence of a third party to prove some
fact pertinent to the defense, ... the only issue arising under
Rule 404(b) is whether the evidence is relevant to the
existence or non-existence of some fact pertinent to the
defense." 110 Thus, the court chose to apply an
"asymmetric" standard under FRE 404(b), depending on
whether the evidence was offered by or against the
defendant. 111
Nonetheless, on the facts before it, the court of
appeals in Aboumoussallem affirmed the exclusion of
the exculpatory evidence under FRE 403 on the grounds
oflow probative value as to "common scheme," trial delay,
and potential jury confusion, 112 as not having been an
abuse of discretion.
In Stevens, on the other hand, the Third Circuit found
that it was reversible error to have excluded the
exculpatory evidence of similar crimes by a third person,
as the proffered evidence survived both a FRE 404(b)
and 403 analysis. 113

been collateral and irrelevant to issue of innocence of
defendant, who claimed that witness, and not defendant, was
participant in the charged crime). See also supra note 104.
106

United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1384, 1401-07 (3d
Cir. 1991) (reversible error to exclude evidence that victim of
very similar crime, who was of same race as his assailant, did
not identify defendant, to show that eyewitness of another race
had misidentified defendant in charged crime; evidence
qualified under FRE 404(b) and 403).
107

726 F.2d 906 (2dCir. 1984)(cited in Sessoms, 357 Md. at28788, 744 A.2d at 17).
108

109

Id. at 911.

!d. ("Whether or not evidence concerning a coconspirator's 'plan' to inform his couriers could be introduced
by a prosecutor to prove a defendant's knowledge, we believe
the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers
similar acts evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as
when a prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword").

110

Id. at 911-12 (footnotes and citations omitted).

111

The Second Circuit relied on the fact that FRE 609, regarding
impeachment of witnesses by their prior convictions, was
asymmetric in its treatment of the accused versus other
witnesses, explicitly providing (before its amendment in 1990)
for consideration only of a prejudicial effect to the defendant.
!d. at 912 n.5. In this author's opinion, the fact that FRE 609 is
explicit in such treatment, and FRE 404(b) is not is, to the
contrary, clear evidence that FRE 404(b) itself was not intended
to treat accuseds and non-accuseds differently. Any desirable
flexibility may be accommodated via FRE 403.
112

113

Id. at 912 n.5.
935 F.2dat 1107.
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d. The Sessoms Court Should Have Held that the
Trial Judge Correctly Found that Rule 5-404(b)
Applied
The court of appeals' decision in Sessoms involved
evidence that was offered by the defense. The court may
have thought it was "helping" criminal defendants by
holding that Rule 5-404(b) applies only with regard to
evidence of other acts by an accused. But the court did
not restrict its decision to evidence offered by the accused.
Sessoms' plain language applies equally to free the
government from the strictures of Rule 5-404(b) when it
offers "other acts" evidence regarding co-conspirators or
defense witnesses other than the accused. Certainly a
criminal accused might suffer unfair prejudice from such
evidence. 114
The policy reasons underlying FRE 404 and Md.
Rule 5-404 support the application ofFRE 404(b) and
Rule 5-404(b) to all persons' "other acts," no matter
by whom offered. Only if the "other acts" evidence
has some "special relevance" should the trial court
admit it; to hold otherwise would waste precious court
time and confuse and distract the fact-finder, as well
as risk unfairly prejudicing one or the other party's
case.

e. A Better Path Would Be to Limit Faulkner

did not want to impose the high Faulkner standard of
"clear and convincing evidence" on an accused who
wished to offer exculpatory evidence-- in Sessoms, of
a third person's other acts. This problem, however,
would be better solved in a way other than making
Rule 5-404(b) altogether inapplicable to acts of persons
other than the accused.
First, the court could have reasonably held that, for
policy reasons, the Faulkner gloss regarding "clear and
convincing evidence" applies only when the "other acts"
evidence is offered against a criminal accused. There are
good reasons to single out the accused for special
protection from the risk of unfair prejudice, as well as not
to erect too high a bar against the accused's admission of
relevant evidence in his or her defense. 115 This approach
would have been the easiest one to take.
Another, more intellectually attractive possibility
would have been to overrule that part ofFaulkner which
requires "clear and convincing evidence" ofthe other acts,
leaving the strength of proof as a factor in Faulkner's
final step of balancing probative value versus
competing considerations. This approach would put
Maryland squarely in line with the federal cases, 116
such as McCourt andAboumoussallem, that apply FRE
404(b) and then FRE 403. Indeed, Maryland followed
this same approach in Rule 5-609, when it rejected as
unnecessary FRE 609( a)( 1) 's explicitly asymmetric

It may be that the Court of Appeals of Maryland
E.g., State v. Garfole, 388 A.2d 587, 591 (N.J. 1978) ("[A]
lower standard of degree of similarity of offenses may justly be
required of a defendant using other-crimes evidence
defensively than is exacted from the State when such evidence
is used incriminatorily"). See United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d
1380, 1384, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991 )("When a defondant proffers
'other crimes' evidence under Rule 404(b ), there is no
possibility of prejudice to the defendant; therefore, the other
crime need not be a 'signature' crime. Instead, it only need be
sufficiently similar to the crime at bar so that it is relevant under
Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402, and that its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by Fed.R.Evid. 403 considerations").
115

See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 604 n.11
(11th Cir. 1990) ("The plain language of Rule 404(b) refers to
'persons,' not 'defendants,' and Rule 404(a) carves out specific
exceptions relating to the 'accused,' 'victim[s],' and
'witness[es].' Where, as in Morano and this case, the nondefendant's 'extraneous' act, if proved, directly supports the
guilt ofthe defendant as to the crime charged, that 'extraneous'
act should not, it seems, be subject to proof through the
improper character-evidence route condemned by Rule 404");
United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 671, rehearing denied
(1Oth Cir. 1989) (evidence of unlawful acts in connection with
business that was predecessor to one involved in prosecution
was not admissible against defendant where evidence
concerned bad acts of defendant's other associates, not
defendant, and was not sufficiently tied to him). See also supra
notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
114
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See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)
(proponent need only provide sufficient evidence to support
fact-finder's reasonable finding offact that the alleged actor
committed the act).
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treatment of accuseds and other witnesses, with regard
to impeachment by prior conviction, because the role
of the witness will affect the trial court's determination
of the degree of risk of unfair prejudice. 117

3. Sessoms Majority Both Misconstrues Rule 5616(b)(3) and Overlooks the Hearsay Rule
The Sessoms majority misinterpreted Rule 5616(b)(3)1 18 when it held that evidence ofthe allegation
of a robbery of a third person by the victim's brother, a
few hours after the defendant's alleged rape of the victim
and the defendant's being beaten by the brother and his
friend, should have been admitted to show a "motive to
lie" 119 on the part ofthe victim and the brother, both of
whom testified at trial.

a. The Brother'sAIIeged Robbery of a Third Person
Provided No Motive to Falsely Claim that the
Defendant Had Raped the Victim
Rule 5-616(a)(3) permits evidence of other acts
that directly create a motive to testify falsely in the
case before the court, as was the situation in the United

117

Mo. RuLE 5-609(a) provides, in pertinent part:

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted
of a crime shall be admitted if ... (2) the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to
the witness or the objecting party.
118
Mo. RuLE 5-616(b)(3) provides: "Extrinsic evidence of bias,
prejudice, interest, or other motive to testify falsely may be
admitted whether or not the witness has been examined about
the impeaching fact and has failed to admit it."
119

120

States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska. 120
There the government's principal witness's juvenile
probationary status was held to be relevant to show
his motive to shift the blame for the charged crime
from himself to the defendant. Had the witness been
charged with the crime, he would have been
incarcerated. His probationary status "upped the
stakes" for the witness with regard to the outcome of
the particular case before the court.
In Sessoms, the defendant testified to facts suggesting
that the victim's brother beat and robbed him and that the
victim and her brother concocted the rape allegation as a
cover-up for that robbery. The trial court properly
admitted that evidence as relevant to the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of the alleged rape.
But the court of appeals went too far in holding that
it was error to exclude evidence of another alleged robbery
by the brother. This robbery had nothing to do with the
defendant. Its alleged commission gave the victim and
her brother no reason to falsely accuse the defendant
of anything.
Its only relevance would be as pure propensity
evidence. The logical progression would have to be
that (1) the brother robbed the third person, therefore
(2) it is more likely that he robbed the defendant, too.
And if the accusation is offered for its truth, as it had

357Md.at292, 744A.2dat19.

415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("A more particular attack on the
witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination
directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to
issues or personalities in the case at hand"); Ebb v. State, 341
Md. 578,589 & n.2, 671 A.2d 974,980 & n.2 (1996).

For an example of a case where the proffered evidence
was insufficiently related to the pending case to be admissible
under Davis, see, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 598 F.Supp. 469,
4 74-7 5 (D .Me. 1984) (court having provided two opportunities
for defense counsel to examine prosecution witness to show, as
foundation, any potential bias on his part resulting from
unrelated, pending indictment against such witness, evidence
of pending homicide charge against witness was properly
excluded as irrelevant), aff'd, 766 F.2d 609,615 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 4 74 U.S. 923 ( 1985), post-conviction reliefdenied,
763 F.Supp. 658,666 (D. Me. 1991), aff'd, 965 F.2d 1184,1185 (1st
Cir. 1992), dismissal ofpost-conviction reliefaffirmed, 178 F. 3d
34,57 (l st Cir. 1999). See also United States v. Young, 952 F.2d
1252, 1259 (lOth Cir. 1991) (whether employer accused former
employee of embezzlement was collateral to whether another
employee committed bank fraud, and, thus, former employee's
testimony was inadmissible to refute employer's denial that he
accused former employee of embezzlement).
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to be, to logically help to prove what it is offered to
prove, then, as Judge Wilner pointed out in dissent, it
is a "rank hearsay accusation ... [properly] excluded
because it was hearsay, irrelevant, and, on balance,
unduly prejudicial to the State." 121

b. Even if the Court Had Been Correct that the
Evidence Was Relevant to Impeachment, It Was
Cumulative, and Its Exclusion Was an Appropriate
Exercise of the Trial Court's Discretion
The only remotely plausible non-propensity
argument for admission of any of the scenario
regarding the accusation of a second robbery -although it is one not made by the court -- is that the
victim's subsequent retraction of her identification of
her brother is somehow a "prior bad act" relevant to
her character for truthfulness that she may be asked

121

357 Md. at 296, 744 A.2d at 21 (Wilner, J., dissenting,
joined by Rodowsky and Raker, JJ.).
122

Rule 5-608(b), by its clear terms, does not permit extrinsic
evidence, such as the police officer's testimony, had it been
sought in Sessoms. Rule 5-608(b) provides:
The court may permit any witness to be examined regarding the
witness's own prior conduct that did not result in a conviction
but that the court finds probative of a character trait of
untruthfulness. Upon objection, however, the court may permit
the inquiry only if the questioner, outside the hearing of the
jury, establishes a reasonable factual basis for asserting that
the conduct of the witness occurred. The conduct may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence. (Emphasis added).
123
The case that supports this reading of Rule 5-608(b) is
another rape case, State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319
(1983), where a rape conviction was reversed, because the
defense counsel had not been permitted to ask the victim about
her alleged earlier recantation on cross-examination in another
trial of her testimony on direct in that trial, accusing another of
assault. Ironically, on retrial, the defense was unable to deliver
what it had promised. Second Conviction in Rape Case,
BALTIMORE EvENING SUN, Apr. 10, 1984, at B 12, col. 3 ("The
matter was not brought up at the retrial because it was
subsequently learned that the perjury incident never
occurred .... ").
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about on cross-examination, 122 in the trial court's
discretion under Rule 5-608(b ), to impeach her. 123
Under the facts, even this argument is not compelling.
She did not lie: she simply said she would not say if
the man pointed out was her brother. The trial court's
exclusion of the evidence would not have been an abuse
of discretion under Rule 5-608(b), even if it had been
offered under that Rule.
Moreover, the trial court admitted evidence of the
victim's initial identification of her brother and of her
subsequent statement, "I ain't saying ifhe is my brother or
he isn't." Certainly its exclusion of the third person's
tangential, intervening accusation ought not to have been
held to be an abuse of discretion. The jury had already
learned of the sister's loyalty to the brother and the
brother's prior robbery convictions for other robberies,
and the excluded evidence would have been merely
cumulative. 124
It was essentially this position that the Sessoms
dissent took. Judge Wilner, joined by Judges Raker and
Rodowsky, would have affirmed the trial court's linedrawing as an appropriate exercise of its discretion
under Rule 5-403. 125 The majority's refusal to do so-having taken away Rule 5-404(b)'s propensity rule,
read Rule 5-616(b)(3) too broadly, and left the trial
court empowered only with Rule 5-403 to exclude

The federal courts do not share what seems to be
Maryland's bent toward particularly liberal admissibility of prior
statements by rape victims regarding unrelated cases. United
States v. Withorn, 204 F. 3d 790,795 (8th Cir. 2000) (allegedly
false prior rape accusations by victim are inadmissible under
either FRE 412 or 608(b)).
124

See, e.g., United States v. Delfonso, 707 F.2d 757,762 (3d Cir.

1982).
125
357 Md. at 294-302, 744 A.2d at 21-25 (Wilner, J., dissenting,
joined by Rodowsky and Raker, JJ.).

126

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361,365 (6th Cir.
1997) (in prosecution of inmate for mailing threatening message
to President and Vice President of United States, trial court
properly excluded "distracting and immaterial collateral
allegations" against prison guards, through which inmate
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unhelpful evidence -- unduly curtails the trial judges'
gatekeeping role in monitoring the admission of
evidence.
More fundamentally, it loses sight of the purpose of
the rules of evidence in the criminal trial system: fairness
and justice to all defendants, victims, and witnesses. 126
The following excerpt from Boyd v. United States,
quoted by the court of appeals in Wynn, regarding other
crimes there by the accused, can just as easily be
applied to the danger of unfair prejudice against the
rape victim and her brother in Sessoms:
Whether Standley robbed Brinson and Mode,
and whether he and Boyd robbed Hall, were
matters wholly apart from the inquiry as to the
murder of Dansby. They were collateral to the
issue to be tried .... Proof of them only tended
to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to
draw their minds away from the real issue, and
to produce the impression that they were
wretches whose lives were of no value to the
community, and who were not entitled to the full
benefit ofthe rules prescribed by law...." 127
Putting the victim on trial is a time-honored defense
strategy. 128 Sessoms facilitates general character
attacks on victims and their families, tending to portray
them as undeserving of protection.
The Sessoms majority reversed the trial court,

"improperly sought to gamer the jurors' sympathy for
himself, and inflame them against the authorities").
142 U.S. 450,457-58 (1892)(quoted in ff)lnn, 351 Md. at 311,
718 A.2d at 589-90).
127

128

E.g., United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597,604 (11th Cir.
1990).

129

357 Md. at 302-03,744 A.2d at 25 ("The only possible basis
for [the alleged second robbery victim's] hearsay statement, to
show propensity for violence or robbery on the part of [the
rape victim's brother] would be as an attack on his credibility,
allowed by Rule 5-607. As noted, however, [the brother's] past

apparently because the majority thought that the rape
victim and her brother might have lied about the rape.

criminal record was fully exposed to the jury. He admitted to
being convicted of armed robbery in 1997, of robbery
committed the day after the alleged rape of [his sister], and of
robbery committed in 1988. What [the third person's]
unsubstantiated hearsay accusation would have added to this
attack on [the brother's] credibility is a mystery to me. Rule 5403, which sits atop nearly all rules of admissibility, provides
that even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice or by considerations of needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. The trial judge determined that [the third
person's] accusation was irrelevant and, to the extent it had
any probative value, that value was outweighed by undue
prejudice to the State. That is quintessentially a judgment call,
to which great deference is due ....") (Wilner, J., dissenting,
joined by Rodowsky and Raker, JJ.).
130

After all:
"[Important coordinate factors, highly material to
the sound administration of the trial process, require
appraisal along with the factor of the degree of
relevance of defendant's proffered proofs ....
Defendant's proffer ... does create the possibility
of undue consumption of time and of danger that
the jury might be confused or misled ....
Defendant's proofs of the other occurrences ...
would generate ... mini-trials as to the truth of those
claims."

State v. Garfole, 388 A.2d 587,592-93 (N.J. 1978). See, e.g.,
United States v. Westbrook, 125 F. 3d 996, 1006-08 (7th Cir.1997)
(no abuse of discretion in excluding some of defendant's
evidence of gang affiliation ofthird parties, offered by
defendant to explain his fear of reprisals, in drug conspiracy
prosecution; defendant was permitted to testifY that his alleged
confederate was gang member, that gang's members were
dangerous, and no relationship was drawn between charged
conspiracy and gang membership), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1036,
118 S.Ct. 643 (1997); United States v. Pascarella, 84 F. 3d 61, 70
(2d Cir. 1996) (proper to have excluded some evidence proffered
by defendant to show that codefendant had duped him into
depositing stolen checks in his personal account; excluded
evidence was repetitive, inadmissible hearsay, confusing, or of
only marginal relevance; defendant was permitted to present
considerable evidence on claim; much of excluded evidence
could have led to "trial within a trial" on whether codefendant
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The jury had ample impeachment evidence with which
to gauge the credibility of the victim and her brother.
As Judge Wilner aptly pointed out, 129 the majority
should have stepped back and respected the trial judge's
appropriate exercise of discretion, 130 even though it
may not have been the same ruling the appellate judges
would have made, had they sat as trial judges.
Arming the trial courts only with Rule 5-403 opens
too wide a window for evidence of other acts of persons
other than the accused, whether offered by the defense or
the prosecution. The court of appeals would be better
advised to simply remove the Faulkner "clear and
convincing evidence" standard from the application ofRule
5-404(b).

analyzing "other acts" evidence in criminal cases
concerning acts of persons other than the accused. Far
better to apply Rule 5-404(b), which provides a route
for the admission of sufficiently probative "other acts"
evidence, remove the Faulkner gloss requiring clear
and convincing proof of those acts, and rely on the
trial courts' application of Rule 5-403 to exclude
insufficiently probative evidence, regardless which
party offers it.

IV. CONCLUSION
Four recent decisions by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland have unduly burdened trial courts in their rulings
regarding "other acts" evidence. Unnecessary reversals
will result from rtjlnn 's refusal to evaluate whether the
trial court's decision was justified on a ground not stated
explicitly at the trial level. The same is true of Streater's
requirements that the trial judge, having ruled correctly on
the stated objection, rule sua sponte under Rule 5-404(b)
and then provide a detailed Faulkner analysis on the
record. Klauenberg's misapplication of the Rule is
sure to add to the confusion.
Contrary to the majority federal law, Sessoms
leaves the courts unable to use Rule 5-404(b) in

had duped defendant and others in past by depositing checks in
their accounts without their knowledge); United States v.
Sanchez, 74 F.3d 562,566-67 (5th Cir. 1996) (in prosecution of
police officer for violating civil rights of prostitutes by using
threat of arrest to coerce them to perform sexual acts, no abuse
of discretion to exclude testimony of another officer that
prostitute who had no association with victims told him that he
"would be next," where there was no evidence that any of
officer's victims conspired to conjure charges against him and
there was substantial and corroborated evidence of officer's
guilt); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 602-03 (11th Cir.
1990) (affirming exclusion of evidence proffered by defense as
appropriate exercises of trial court's discretion under FRE
608(b), 609(a)(1), and403).

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 28

About the Author: Lynn McLain (B.A., 1971,
University ofPennsylvania; J.D., 1974, with distinction,
Duke University School of Law), was an associate at
Piper & Marbury, a graduate fellow at Duke, and then
in 1977 joined the faculty at the University of Baltimore
School of Law, where she is the Dean Joseph Curtis
Faculty Fellow and teaches courses in evidence and
copyrights.
Prof. McLain is admitted to the bars ofthe Maryland Court
of Appeals (December 1974), the United States District
Court for the District ofMaryland (March 1975), and the
United States Supreme Court (March 1990). She is the
author of a treatise on Maryland and federal evidence.
As a Special Reporter for the Maryland Court of
Appeals' Rules Committee, she participated in drafting
Maryland's rules of evidence.

Articles

The University of Baltimore Law Forum
Articles Solicitation

The University ofBaltimore Law Farum is currently requesting articles for submission
relating to issues of importance in Maryland and/or Federal law.
Please contact or submit materials to:

Articles Editor
University of Baltimore Law Forum
The John and Frances Angelos Law Center
1420 North Charles Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
(410) 837-4493

E-Mail: UBaltLF@hotmail.com

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 29

